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This paper provides new evidence on what types of individuals are most likely to choose a defined
contribution (DC) plan over a defined benefit (DB) plan.  Making use of administrative data from
the State Universities Retirement System (SURS) of Illinois, we study the decisions of nearly 50,000
new employees who make a one-time, irrevocable choice between a traditional DB plan, a portable
DB plan, and an entirely self-managed DC plan.  Because the SURS-covered earnings of these employees
are not covered under the Social Security system, their choices provides insight into the DB vs. DC
preferences of individuals with regard to a primary source of their retirement income.  We find that
a majority of participants fail to make an active decision and are thus defaulted into the traditional
DB plan after 6 months.  We also find that those individuals who are most likely to be financially sophisticated
are most likely to choose the self-managed DC plan, despite the fact that, given plan parameters, the
DC plan is inferior to the portable DB plan under reasonable assumptions about future financial market
returns.  We discuss both rational and behavioral reasons that might explain this finding.
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  In recent years, numerous proposals have been forwarded to fully or partially replace the 
defined benefits provided by the U.S. Social Security system with personal retirement accounts.  
A key feature of many personal account proposals, including those of the President’s 
Commission to Strengthen Social Security and the plan forwarded by President Bush in 2005, is 
that participation in personal accounts would be voluntary.  Individuals would be given the 
opportunity to choose whether to redirect some of their existing payroll taxes away from the 
current system and into personal retirement accounts (PRAs).  In exchange for the ability to 
participate in the personal accounts program, and individual would give up the right to some 
portion of the traditional OASDI benefit, a feature that is commonly referred to as a “benefit 
offset.”  An interesting and difficult question is who would choose to participate in such a plan 
were it to be offered. 
  Understanding participation is of more than academic interest.  Participants in personal 
accounts would face a different risk and return profile of retirement benefits than would non-
participants, and thus understanding who is most likely to participate might influence one’s view 
of the individual welfare implications of reform.  At an aggregate level, participation rates are a 
critical assumption in understanding the fiscal implications of Social Security reform proposals 
that involve a redirection of existing payroll tax revenue away from the Trust Funds and into 
personal accounts.  For a given reform, high participation rates would increase the size of the 
transition cost that must be financed in the early years of a reform and, correspondingly, would 
result in larger reductions in pay-as-you-go expenditures in future years.  When scoring reform 
proposals, the Social Security Office of the Chief Actuary typically handles this uncertainty by 
showing the financial implications of reform under several alternative assumptions, such as 
100%, 67%, 50% and 0%.  The uncertainty about participation rates is apparent from the 
comparison of the Administration and CBO estimates of participation for the President’s plan.  
In its analysis of the President’s FY 2007 budget, the CBO estimated that approximately one-
third of workers would sign up for the accounts under the President’s plan, whereas the OMB 
projected a two-thirds participation rate (CBO, 2006). 
  As important as participation rates are, there is very little useful guidance in the literature 
on how to estimate them.  Unfortunately, the very large literature on 401(k) participation rates is 
of only limited use because the alternative to participating is entirely different in a 401(k) than in   2
most Social Security reform proposals.  If one chooses not to participate in the 401(k), the 
alternative is to take the compensation in the form of taxable wages.  In such a case, the main 
trade-off is between current and future consumption.  In contrast, in Social Security plans with a 
benefit offset, the individual would face a trade-off between two alternative methods of financing 
future consumption.  For example, according to President Bush’s 2005 proposal, for every dollar 
that an individual redirected into a personal account, she would have been required to give up a 
traditional benefit amount equal to the annuitized value of that one dollar contribution 
accumulated at a 3 percent real rate of interest.  Thus, if an individual were to receive an average 
real rate of return on the personal account balances in excess of 3 percent then their retirement 
income would be higher due to having participated in the account.  In contrast, if the individual’s 
average real return fell below 3 percent, participation in the account would reduce retirement 
income.  Thus, the decision of whether or not to participate in a Social Security PRA program 
has less to do with one’s views about the relative value of consumption today versus in the future 
(which is the key decision in a 401(k) plan), and more to do with an individual’s beliefs about 
expected financial market returns, mortality risk, financial and political risk, the value of choice, 
the value of inheritability, and so forth.   
  A better way to learn about potential participation rates in a PRA plan would be to 
analyze situations in which an individual worker has an explicit choice between a DB and a DC 
plan, holding job characteristics fixed.  In most cases, however, individuals can only choose their 
pension type by choosing their employer and it is quite clear that a firm’s pension plan is but one 
element in a whole vector of characteristics that vary across jobs and firms.  Thus, one can never 
be sure that the decision to work for an employer that offers a 401(k) instead of an employer that 
offers a DB plan reflects characteristics of the pension as opposed to numerous other differences 
across the employers.  Alternatively, one could attempt to determine the worker characteristics 
that correlate with valuing DC over DB by looking at firm’s that switch pension type.  Such plan 
conversions, however, may be driven more by firm level concerns, such as the costs of plan 
administration, than by employee preferences per se.  Even if the cross-sectional variation in 
which firms choose to convert to a DC plan is correlated with employee preferences, it only tells 
us that some subset of employees valued this shift, not that all employees at the firm valued such 
a shift.    3
Finally, in an ideal world, one would wish to examine the DB vs. DC choice in the 
absence of the confounding effects of the Social Security program itself.  In most private sector 
plans, even if individuals were given a DB vs. DC choice, it would be for income that is above 
that which they expect to receive from Social Security in the first place.  While there have been 
several studies that have been able to examine an explicit DB vs. DC choice, including among 
employees at a large non-profit firm (Yang 2005), among corrections officers in Michigan 
(Papke, 2004) and among faculty in the North Carolina university system (Clark, Ghent and 
McDermed, 2005), employees in all three cases were also covered by the existing Social Security 
system.  Given that the value of annuitization, for example, is a declining function of the fraction 
of wealth already annuitized, this may make individuals more likely to choose a DC if it is on top 
of the DB already provided by Social Security.    
In this paper, we make use of a unique data set of employees in the State Universities 
Retirement System (SURS) of Illinois.  This sample has four key features that make it a 
particularly valuable environment for studying the DB vs. DC plan choice. First, these 
employees are given an explicit choice between a DB and a DC plan, holding all job 
characteristics fixed.
1  Specifically, in their first six months of employment, employees are asked 
to make a one-time, lifetime, irrevocable choice among three retirement plans: (i) a traditional 
formula-based DB plan; (ii) a “portable DB plan,” which is slightly less generous than the 
ordinary DB if one retires from the system, but more generous if they take an early lump-sum 
distribution; and (iii) the “Self-Managed Plan” or SMP, which is a 100 percent self-directed DC 
plan.  Individuals who fail to make an active choice within the first 6 months of employment are 
automatically defaulted into the traditional DB plan. 
  Second, because Illinois is one of several states that opted out of the Social Security 
system,
2 wages of individuals earned from SURS covered employment are not covered by Social 
Security, meaning that no OASDI payroll taxes are withheld and no OASDI benefits accrue 
based on these earnings.  Thus, unless an individual has substantial employment earnings outside 
                                                 
1 As reported in Clark, Ghent and McDermed 2006, the choice between a DB and a DC plan is a common feature of 
pension plans at public (but not private) universities.   
2 According to the GAO (2003), “historically, Social Security did not require coverage of government employees 
because they had their own retirement systems, and there was concern over the question of the federal government’s 
right to impose a tax on state governments.”  Other states whose employees do not participate in Social Security 
include California, Colorado, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Ohio and Texas.   4
of the SURS system, it will be SURS and not Social Security that will provide the primary 
source of income in retirement.   
Third, the combined employer/employee retirement contributions to the SURS system 
are, at minimum, 14.6 percent of annual salary, which is larger than the payroll tax paid by those 
in the Social Security system.  Therefore, the SURS system looms large as part of a participant’s 
lifetime financial plan.     
Fourth, the SURS data includes a diverse group of employees, including campus 
administrators, faculty members, clerical staff, individuals in the employ of university police and 
fire services, and others.  Prior studies of the DB vs. DC choice using state university employees 
(e.g., Clark et al 2005, Clark & Pitts 1999) were limited to faculty members only, and thus it is 
more difficult to generalize the results to populations that are less highly educated.  Our sample 
allows us the opportunity to more carefully examine how the DB vs. DC decision might vary 
across broad education and occupation groups.     
  Using administrative data on the full universe of SURS covered employees since the plan 
choice was first made available starting in 1998/99, we analyze what types of employees are 
most likely to choose the DC plan over the portable or traditional DB plan.  We have two major 
findings.  First, despite the projections by SURS at the start of the program that a majority of 
new employees would actively select the SMP or portable plan, in fact the majority of new 
employees never make any active pension choice, and thus are defaulted in to the traditional 
plan.  After the initial publicity surrounding the introduction of plan choice started to fade, the 
proportion of new employees not making a choice, and hence defaulting into the traditional plan, 
increased from 43 percent in 1999 to roughly three-fifths over the period 2001-2004.  Second, 
we find that approximately 15 percent of new employees choose the Self-Managed Plan, despite 
the fact that the SMP is likely an inferior choice due to plan parameters that make it less 
generous than the Portable plan under reasonable assumptions.  Interestingly, we find that 
individuals are more likely than average to choose the SMP if they are more highly educated (as 
proxied by being an academic employee as opposed to staff, as well as being at a University as 
opposed to a community college), have higher earnings, are married, and work at an institution 
where a higher fraction of other employees also chose the SMP.  We attribute much of the 
selection of the SMP to framing effects in how the plan choices are communicated to new   5
employees, but we discuss alternative explanations as well, including beliefs about political risk 
facing the DB and portable DB systems. 
   This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the basic structure of the SURS 
system, including more details about each of the plan options and how the choices are made.  
Section 3 discusses the administrative data in more detail, including its strengths and limitations.  
In section 4, we outline our empirical methods and present some simple tabulations of plan 
choice.  Section 5 reports more formal results.  Section 6 concludes and sets forth several 
directions for subsequent research.   
 
2.  SURS Choices 
2.1 Background on SURS and Allowance of Choice 
  As the name implies, the State Universities Retirement System of Illinois is the 
retirement program for all employees of the Illinois state university and community college 
system.  Established in 1941, SURS “serves over 70 employers in Illinois, including state 
universities, community colleges, and state agencies.  It employs more than 100 people in offices 
in Champaign and Chicago and provides benefit services to over 180,000 members throughout 
the world.” (SURS website, 6/19/06).  “SURS covers all faculty and support staff of Illinois 
higher public education including universities, colleges, Class I community colleges, scientific 
surveys, and other related agencies.”  (SURS Traditional Defined Benefit Package, pg. 1).  There 
is a large range in the size of the employers, with several state agencies (e.g., the State Water 
Survey) having only a few new employees during our sample period while the University of 
Illinois at Chicago and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign together comprise about 
one out of every four new employees over this period. 
As noted above, the employees include university, college or campus administrators, 
faculty members, administrative and clerical staff, individuals in the employ of university police, 
and others.  In general, an individual will participate as long as their position requires them to 
work “continuously for at least one academic term or 4 months, whichever is less, and … 
employment is not temporary, intermittent, or irregular … SURS participation ends on the date 
you retire or terminate employment with a SURS-covered employer.”  Eligibility does not extend 
to students regularly attending classes at a SURS-covered employer who are employed on a part-  6
time or temporary basis for that employer, to J-1 or F-1 visa holders who have not yet established 
residency or to current annuitants from SURS.   
  Social Security taxes are not withheld from SURS earnings, and SURS participants are 
not eligible for Social Security coverage based on their employment with a SURS covered 
employer.
3  SURS withholds 8 percent of salary as an employee contribution to SURS.  The 
State/employer contribution varies by plan, and will be described in more detail below.   
  Prior to 1998, all employees in the SURS system were covered by the traditional defined 
benefit (DB) system.  In the mid-1990s, however, pressure began building on the State 
Legislature to offer a DC option to state employees.  In 1997, the Illinois Legislature passed a 
law allowing participating employers to offer individuals a choice of three plans.  The addition of 
a DC option was viewed as having three key benefits.  First, it was believed that a DC plan 
would be more attractive to potential new employees.  The SURS executive director at the time 
was quoted as saying “The legislation passed because universities were saying they needed it to 
attract people from other states.”
4  Second, the creation of the SMP option was viewed as a cost-
reduction measure by the state, due to the fact that the state’s contributions to the SMP are lower 
than the contributions required to fully fund benefits under the traditional DB option.
5  Finally, 
the shift was also promoted as a way to impose fiscal discipline on the State Legislature.  State 
Senator Peter Fitzgerald, a leading advocate of the switch, argued that the DC plan would force 
lawmakers to put the money up-front so that employees could invest it, rather than offering 
promises of future benefits that the Legislature had a history of under-funding.
6     
  The next three sub-sections summarize the key features of each of the three pension 
options. 
 
2.2 Traditional Benefit Package 
                                                 
3 Participants hired after March 1986 are subject to withholding for Medicare. 
4 “University Workers Get Greater choice in Retirement Planning.”  The State Journal Register.  Natalie Boehme.  
March 12, 1999, page 39. 
5 Section 15-158.3 of the SURS governing statute requires an actuarial assessment of “the extent to which employee 
optional retirement plan participation has reduced the State’s required contributions to the System … in relation to 
what the State’s contributions to the System would have been … if the self-managed plan had not been 
implemented.”  
6 “Fitzgerald Floats Trial Balloon to Change State Pension System to a 401(k) Plan.”  Don Thomson.  Daily Herald.  
January 14, 1997.   7
  This SURS defined benefit (DB) retirement plan is the only one that was in place prior to 
1998.  As of the writing of this paper, the Traditional plan remains the default option for 
individuals who do not make an active plan designation within 6 months of their hire date (or 
specifically, the date that is received by SURS as the individual’s certification of employment.)  
Employees contribute 8 percent of pay, which is the same contribution rate as in the other two 
options.  Of this 8 percent, SURS reports that 6.5 percent is designated to fund the normal 
retirement benefit, 0.5 percent is designated to fund automatic annual increases in retirement 
benefits, and 1 percent is designated to fund survivor benefits, although it is not clear how 
closely these reported designations match actuarial costs.  Because all SURS-covered workers 
are employees of the State of Illinois, the employer contribution to SURS is a general State 
obligation.  For participants in the Traditional plan, SURS documents state “the State’s share for 
a retirement annuity averages about 9.1 percent of the total earnings of all SURS participants in a 
Defined Benefit Plan” (pg 2).  This 9.1 percent figure is an over-simplification, and most likely 
represents a lower bound on the average cost to the State.  Indeed, for fiscal year 2007, the 
employer normal cost for the various benefits and expenses associated with the DB plan (which 
includes both the Traditional and the Portable plan) are approximately 10.8 percent of payroll.
7    
    Benefits from the traditional plan are paid as life annuities.  An individual is eligible to 
receive benefits at age 55 with at least 8 years of service, age 62 with 5 years of service, or at any 
age with 30 years of service (if employment terminated after 8/2/02).  An individual must start 
receiving a retirement annuity no later than April 1
st of the year following the year they reach age 
70½ if they are not participating in SURS or another Illinois state system.    
  For most employees there are two formulas for calculating the retirement annuity.
8  For 
each individual, the benefit will be calculated each way, and the worker receives the larger of the 
calculated amounts.   
  The two formulas are: 
(a) The General Formula:  For those retiring at age 60 after July 1997, the formula is: 
Benefit = 2.2% x Years of Service x Final Average Earnings  
For non-disabled individuals with less than 30 years of service, there is an early 
retirement actuarial reduction of 0.5% for each month under age 60.  For retirement 
                                                 
7 Based on personal communication with SURS, August 7, 2006. 
8 A third option, known as the minimum annuity formula, is so rarely used that it is largely obsolete.   8
after August 2, 2002, retirement at any age – without reduction – is permitted if a 
member has 30 or more years of service.     
(b) Money Purchase formula:  For most individuals, the money purchase formula is equal 
to 6.5% of the employee’s salary (6.5% of the 8% contribution is for the retirement 
benefit, excluding survivor and inflation adjustments) plus a 140% match by the State 
of Illinois plus interest accumulated at a rate set by the SURS Board all divided by a 
unisex annuity factor.       
Both these approaches to calculating the benefit have numerous additional complexities that 
we do not expand on here in the interest of space.  For example, there are special rules governing 
a supplemental minimum annuity guarantee, reversionary annuities to provide a spouse or 
dependent with higher income than the usual survivor benefits, and an additional formula that 
applies only to police officers and firefighters.   
For all employees, the benefit is calculated under both methods (with one extra in the case of 
police and fire), and the individual receives the higher of these benefit amounts.  In recent years, 
the majority of retirees have received the highest level of benefits under the money purchase 
formula.  The only additional restriction is that, regardless of method, benefits in retirement 
cannot exceed 80 percent of final average pay (and some individuals have lower maximum 
pensions based on their termination date.)  Benefits are automatically increased by 3 percent 
every January 1.  There are also generous survivor benefits both before and after retirement. In 
particular, the benefit that comes out of these calculations is automatically paid as a joint and 
50% contingent survivor annuity.  If a single individual retires under the Traditional plan, then in 
addition to receiving the calculated monthly benefit, he is entitled to a refund of 1/8 of his 
contributions plus interest. 
The service credit is a key parameter in the calculation of one’s benefits.  In any academic 
year (from September 1 through August 31), an individual may earn no more than 1 year of 
service credit, and it is possible to earn fractional years of credit.  A complex set of rules 
determines how service credits are affected by disability leave, sick leave, unused sick leave, 
prior service with other employers, military service, and other similar situations.  A second key 
parameter is an individual’s final average earnings (or “final rate of earnings.”  This is basically 
the four consecutive academic years of service in which the individual’s earnings were the   9
highest.  There are limitations on the rate at which earnings are permitted to grow year-over-year 
as part of this calculation.       
While the traditional benefit packages is quite generous relative to most private sector plans, 
it is important to bear in mind that the SURS package must substitute for Social Security as well 
as a private pension.  Indeed, the 2.2 percent formula multiplier is, if anything, a bit less 
generous than that in other public pension plans whose employees are not covered by Social 
Security.  A recent study of public pensions (Ford 2005) indicates an average formula multiplier 
of 2.27 percent among such states (versus 1.95 percent average among public pension plans in 
states that are covered by Social Security).  Of course, over the 2001-2005 period, approximately 
two-thirds of SURS retirees received benefits via the money purchase option, which means this 
benefit was higher than that calculated under the traditional formula.   
In short, the Traditional Benefit package is a fairly generous pension plan for those who 
retire from the system.  The major downside of this plan, however, is that it is not very generous 
for those who leave the system early and take a refund.  Regardless of length of service, 
participants in the Traditional Benefit package who take a refund from the system upon 
terminating employment will receive their own contributions (equal to 8 percent of salary) plus a 
4.5% interest rate.  No employer/State contributions are refunded, even after the individual is 
vested.  Many individuals who leave the system early would be better off leaving their 
contributions in the SURS system and claiming a benefit based on the money purchase formula. 
In contrast to private sector DB plans, the SURS benefits are not insured by the PBGC, and 
it is worth noting that the State of Illinois has massively under-funded its share of the pension 
obligations.  As of March 31, 2006, the State Universities Retirement System investment 
portfolio (which covers both the Traditional and the Portable plan options) was valued at nearly 
$14.5 billion, but faced liabilities of over $21 billion, for a funding ratio of only 68%.  In 
actuality, the funding problem is worse than these official statistics indicated because the 
liabilities are discounted using a high discount rate that reflects the expected return on plan assets 
rather than using a riskless rate of interest that would be appropriate given the constitutional 
guarantee of benefits to participants (discussed below).  The degree of official under-funding is 
widely reported in the Illinois press, as well as in the regular participant newsletters sent out by 
SURS, and thus most participants are likely aware that there is political risk to their future 
benefits.     10
This political risk is, however, substantially mitigated by the fact that Article XIII, Section 5 
of the Illinois Constitution states that “membership in any pension or retirement system of the 
State … shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be 
diminished or impaired.”  This “impairment clause,” as it has come to be known, means that the 
Legislature cannot reduce the generosity of the SURS benefit without a constitutional 
amendment.  Nonetheless, uncertainty about the ability of the State to make good on its future 
funding obligations may lead some individuals to prefer the Self-Managed Plan.  Indeed, as of 
July 1, 2005, the power to set the interest rate used in calculating benefits under the money 
purchase formula has been transferred from the SURS Board to the State Comptroller.  In 
addition, the money purchase option was eliminated for employees starting after July 1, 2005.  
Such actions likely reinforce the belief that future benefits from SURS are not free from political 
risk.       
 
2.3  Portable Benefit Package 
The portable benefit package is a modified version of the Traditional package.  The first key 
differences is that if the person leaves the system early and takes a refund of their contributions, 
they have historically received a rate of interest that is substantially higher than the 4.5% 
provided by the Traditional plan.  Indeed, this Effective Interest Rate (which, until 6/30/05 was 
the same rate used to calculate retirement benefits under the Money Purchase option) has 
averaged over 8% for the past 20 years.
9  If an individual has at least 5 years of service, and is 
thus vested, he/she also receives a full dollar-for-dollar match from the State.  In short, any 
individual who departs SURS service and takes a refund rather than leaving the money in the 
SURS system, the portable plan is far more generous than the traditional plan. 
The second key difference is that the benefits from the portable plan are not as generous as 
the traditional plan if the individual retires from the system.  In particular, for participants in the 
traditional plan, the monthly benefit amount is paid as a joint and survivor annuity.  Single 
individuals under the traditional plan can take 1/8 of their contributions plus interest as a lump-
sum at retirement in lieu of the survivor benefits.  In contrast, under the portable plan, the 
                                                 
9 Since 7/1/05, the State Comptroller sets the ERI for the Money Purchase option when calculating retirement 
benefit.  The SURS Board continues to set the ERI for refund calculations.  Since 7/1/06, these rates have diverged.   11
retirement benefit is a paid as a single life annuity, and married individuals must accept an 
actuarial reduction to convert it to a joint and survivor annuity.   
There are other differences as well.  For example, whereas participants in the Traditional 
plan are required to annuitize their assets, Portable plan participants do have the option to take a 
lump-sum at retirement.  Doing so, however, comes at the high cost of losing eligibility for 
retiree health benefits. 
 
2.4  Self-Managed Plan (SMP) 
The SMP is an entirely participant-directed defined contribution plan that invests a total of 
14.6% of salary (8% employee and at least 6.6% employer
10) into retirement accounts.  
Participants are able to choose from a variety of mutual funds and annuity contracts from TIAA-
CREF and Fidelity.  Upon full vesting after 5 years of service, the individual is entitled to a 
100% refund of both employer and employee contributions plus any investment gains or losses.  
Upon retirement, the individual is able to choose from a wide range of annuities (e.g., joint and 
survivor with 50%, 75% or 100% survivor benefits, and the option of 10, 15, and 20 year period 
certain guarantees) or a lump-sum.  As with the Portable plan, however, retirees must annuitize 
their full account balance in order to be eligible for retiree health benefits from the State of 
Illinois. 
All of the educational information provided by SURS, including the instructional videos, the 
program guides and online information, guides new SURS participants through the plan choice 
by focusing on the distinction between DB and DC plans.  A reasonable inference from this 
material, even by financially sophisticated employees, is that the Traditional Benefit Package is 
the best choice for individuals who expect to retire from SURS covered employment, while the 
SMP option is a good choice for highly mobile employees (such as new, untenured faculty 
members) who value choice and are comfortable making their own investment decisions.  The 
Portable plan is largely presented as a modified version of the DB.  Indeed, much of the material 
is structured so as to guide individuals down the DB vs. DC path first, and then discuss the 
Portable vs. Traditional distinction only after one has gone down the DB path.  Thus, many 
                                                 
10 The 6.6% rate has been the rate applied since the program’s inception.  Technically, this rate could rise slightly if 
SURS decides that the cost of providing disability benefits to SMP participants is less than 1%.  It cannot rise 
beyond 7.6%, and indeed is unlikely rise to anywhere near this level due to the cost of paying disability benefits.   12
employees may be left with the general impression that the Portable plan lies somewhere 
between the Traditional and the SMP on nearly all dimensions. 
A more careful examination, however, suggests that the SMP may be an inferior choice, 
relative to the Portable plan, for most employees, regardless of their expected employment 
longevity with a SURS employer.  To understand its inferiority, it is useful to consider the 
benefits from these two options for individuals at different points in their careers. 
First, consider an employee who leaves SURS employment and takes a lump-sum refund 
from the system.  If they leave service prior to vesting (i.e., individuals with less than 5 years of 
service), the differences are small.  In both cases, individuals receive their own 8% contributions.  
In the portable plan, the individual receives the SURS rate of interest, while in the SMP, they 
receive actual investment returns.  After vesting, however, the differences are much larger.  
Under the portable plan, the individual also receives a full 8% match from the State, while in the 
SMP, the individual only receives 6.6%.  Thus, for the SMP to be an optimal choice based solely 
on relative returns (i.e., ignoring political risk), the individual must expect to earn investment 
returns that are sufficient to exceed the rate of interest credited by SURS to the portable plan 
(which has averaged 8-9% nominal for the past 20 years) plus enough extra return to make-up 
the 1.4% of salary shortfall in the State contribution rate.  Assuming an 8% return for the 
portable plan, SMP participants must expect annual rates of return of 8.5% even with a 30-year 
time horizon (those with a 5 year time horizon must achieve an 11.2% average return).
11  Note 
that nominal returns of this level are substantially greater than what one should expect from a 
diversified stock/bond portfolio using historical U.S. data, let alone what one should expect if the 
equity premium going forward is lower than its historical realized value. 
Second, consider an employee who retires from SURS.  In this case, the employee receives 
the higher of the two methods of benefit calculation discussed above.  Just focusing on the 
money purchase option, the individual must, as in the case of a refund, beat the 8-9% effective 
interest rate plus make-up for the contribution shortfall.  Furthermore, even if the Effective 
Interest Rate were to decline in the future, the General Formula provides a benefit floor equal to 
2.2% of final average salary for each year of service.  In short, for long service employees, the 
SMP is an inferior choice to the Traditional or the Portable plans.  
                                                 
11 These calculations assume a 3% annual increase in salary, and a fixed investment return from the SMP.   13
Thus, unlike the theoretical comparison between DB and DC provided by Bodie, Marcus 
and Merton (1988) in which there is a constraint that the two plan types have equal costs to the 
employer, in the case of SURS the required employer contributions to the SMP plan are 
significantly lower than that of the two DB options.  Given this, and the resulting disadvantage of 
the SMP to the Portable plan at all time horizons, it may be surprising that anyone chooses it.  
However, many of the differences just described, such as the difference in the match and the 
magnitude of the Effective Interest Rate, are not easily discernable from the material provided by 
SURS.  Further, as previously mentioned, the framing of the pension plan choice as first a 
decision between DB and DC, as opposed to a direct comparison of all three options 
simultaneously, may also help explain participation in the SMP.  The SURS manual explicitly 
cites as a disadvantage of a DB plan that “members with short service, or those who expect to 
leave their job soon, will not earn a large benefit” while a key advantage of a DC plan is that 
“members can transfer balances to other defined contribution plans should they change 
employers” (SURS, The Power of Choice, p. 5).  However, while the Portable plan is classified 
as a DB-type plan, members with short service are treated essentially the same under the SMP 
and Portable plan options, with the accumulated balances of both allowed to be transferred to 
another plan if the worker changes employers (including employer contributions if vesting has 
occurred). 
In addition to a simple lack of understanding of key plan parameters, there are other reasons 
that individuals may prefer the SMP option, despite its apparent financial disadvantages.  These 
include concerns about political risk in the Traditional and Portable plans, arising from the fact 
that the State of Illinois has consistently under-funded the plans.  While there is a State 
constitutional guarantee against the impairment of benefits for current state pension plan 
participants, the substantial under-funding of the plans may lead some participants to question 
the long-term ability of the State to make good on its pension promises.  In contrast, the State 
contributions to the SMP are made immediately.  Individuals may also have overly-optimistic 
beliefs about future equity market returns that lead them to believe that their SMP investments 
can outperform the SURS rate of interest.  Individuals may also simply place a high value on the 
ability to choose their investment portfolio.  While we are not able to distinguish among these 
various reasons in the current administrative data, we are planning to address these issues in 
follow-on work using a survey of SURS participants.     14
Finally, another difference between the SMP and the other two plans (Portable and 
Traditional), is that employer contributions commence after the employee formally selects the 
SMP option and not when employment starts.  In the Portable and Traditional plans, the 
participant receives credit back to the date of employment for both benefit calculation and refund 
purposes.
12  Thus, a four-month lag between the start of employment and selecting a retirement 
plan will result in the worker losing four months of employer contributions in the SMP plan, but 
will result in no loss of employer contributions in the other two plans.  This provides a financial 
incentive to make a quick decision if one is considering the SMP. 
 
3.  Data 
The State Universities Retirement System of Illinois has provided us with a rich data 
containing administrative records for the entire population of workers who have started working 
for a SURS covered employer subsequent to that employer’s offering of plan choice.  SURS 
provided us with data on both a) employees who had already been covered by SURS at the point 
in time at which their employer first began offering choice and b) new employees who have 
joined the system since choice was first offered.  We are confident that the new employee data is 
complete, i.e., that we observe individuals who were given a choice, even if they subsequently 
left the system, became disabled or died.  With the pre-existing employee data, however, we are 
not confident that we have a complete set of records of individuals who subsequently left the 
system.  Therefore, we will focus our analysis on the “new employee” sample, where there are 
no concerns about sample selection.  Fortunately, this is also the more interesting population to 
examine because their choice is not “contaminated” by the fact that they had significant prior 
service under the Traditional plan.  For pre-existing employees who switched to the SMP at the 
time the new plans were initially adopted, they had to forfeit all prior employer contributions, 
which should have strongly tilted the decision against the SMP (although interestingly, a non-
trivial number of individuals made this choice). 
 As such, our analysis focuses on those individuals that began service with a SURS 
covered employer in 1999 or after.  While most employers adopted the new choices at some 
point during the 1998 calendar year, we only know the year in which an employee began service 
                                                 
12 In this sense, it is as if the employer made contributions retroactively to the first day of employment.  In reality, 
the State contributions are made on an aggregate, not individual, basis and are generally not made at the level that 
would be required for the plan to remain fully funded.   15
with a SURS covered employer, and not the month, we are unable to determine which employees 
joining the system in 1998 joined the employer after adoption of the new plan options.  By 
focusing on the 1999 or after sample, we are confident that we are examining the “post-choice” 
cohorts. 
  The universe of individuals beginning employment in 1999 or after (through 2004) 
consists of approximately 63,000 observations.  However, SURS was unable to provide complete 
earnings records for the entire sample, and thus the sample size drops to just over 45,000 when 
we condition on observing earnings.
13   
  In Table 1, we report the fraction of the population that makes each plan choice in each 
year of our 1999-2004 sample.  Over the entire sample period, we see that slightly under half the 
sample (44%) made an active pension selection, while the majority (56%) were defaulted into 
the Traditional Benefits Package.  The fact that the default option draws such a large number of 
individuals could reflect either the power of the default itself, as one would expect given the 
evidence in this area (e.g., Madrian and Shea, 2001, and Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 
2001), or it could simply reflect that a large number of individuals concluded that the Traditional 
plan was the best choice and therefore just allowed SURS to default them into it.  Another 10% 
of participants made an active choice into the Traditional plan, bringing the total number of 
participants in the Traditional Plan to nearly two-thirds of the sample.  Approximately 15% of 
the sample chose the SMP while just under 19% chose the Portable package.   
  A striking feature of the data is that the fraction of individuals accepting the default 
option has grown steadily over time, from 43% in 1999 to around 58% in 2001, where it has 
remained relative stable since.  This time series pattern perhaps reflects the flurry of local press 
attention paid during the introduction of plan choice, which quickly subsided.   
  The fraction choosing the SMP also shows substantial changes over time.  Specifically, in 
both 1999 and 2000, 22% of the sample chose the SMP.  These years came after a period of 
                                                 
13 Our measure of earnings is the reported earnings in the second year of employment.  While we would have liked 
to use the respondent’s first year of earnings, we were given actual rather than annualized earnings during the first 
year.  Thus, for many individuals who worked only part of the year, we observe only a fraction of their annual 
salary.  We are unable to annualize the data because SURS did not provide us with the month that a person started 
employment.  In addition to dropping observations that are missing earnings, we have experimented with several 
other approaches (including a dummy variable for missing along with its interaction with earnings, imputing each 
missing value with a predicted value, etc.) and found that our coefficient estimates were not terribly sensitive, which 
is not surprising given that the reason earnings is missing is not systematically correlated with plan choice.  This is 
often called an “ignorable case” of missing data in the econometrics literature.     16
extremely high equity market returns, which peaked in early 2000.  In 2001, the fraction 
choosing the SMP fell to only 13.8%, and declined further to 11.5% in 2002.  In contrast, while 
the SMP has seen a sharp decline in enrollment from 2000-2004, enrollment in the Portable plan 
has remained relatively stable in the 18-19% range over the same period. 
  In Table 2, we report summary statistics for a number of key variables.  We first report 
classifications by occupation (academic, staff, or police) interacted whether the individual works 
for a university, community college, or some other employer type.  The single largest group, 
comprising just under one-third of the sample, are academic employees at state universities.  
Staff members at universities and academics at community colleges each contribute another 22-
23% of the sample, while community college staff comprise 15% of the sample.  Police account 
for less then 1% of the sample.  Approximately 8% of the sample is employed by a state agency 
other than a university or community college.   
Interestingly, only two-thirds of the participants in our sample are considered “active” 
SURS participants, meaning that they are still employed by a SURS covered employer and thus 
making contributions.  Most of the rest left SURS employment, while a trivial fraction of the 
sample had died or retired.  Individuals who leave SURS service after 5 years are considered 
vested, and thus eligible to receive State contributions along with their own if they choose the 
Portable of the SMP plan, and thus we will control for this in our analysis.   
  A majority of new employees (57%) are women, and 59% of our sample is married.
14  
The average age in the sample is just over 41 years.  Approximately 14% of the sample has 
“reciprocal service” from another State administered pension plan, such as the State Teacher’s 
Retirement System: this is an important control since these individuals may have a financial 
incentive to stay with the Traditional plan due to rules that coordinate benefits across various 
public plans in the State of Illinois. 
  Average earnings in the sample are only $24,100 per year, but this figure includes part-
time employees (which are over one-quarter of our sample).  If we condition the sample on being 
considered a full-time employee, the average earnings are roughly $43,000 for an academic, 
$35,000 for a police officer, and $28,000 for staff.  In addition to these covariates, we also know 
                                                 
14 For administrative reasons, marital status was missing for some of the individuals who accepted the default 
option.  For these individuals, we imputed their marital status using a Probit analysis on those individuals who took 
the default option and whose marital status was known.   17
information about the individual’s three-digit zip code and their campus, which we will use in 
some of our specifications below.   
While our data is quite rich in many respects, it has the usual limitation of administrative 
data in that we do not know many potentially relevant demographic characteristics, such as 
health status, or non-SURS financial resources such as wealth, spousal earnings, or non-SURS 
earnings.   
 
4.  Unconditional Tabulations and Empirical Methods 
  When an individual joins a SURS covered employer, there are four possible outcomes 
with respect to their pension choice.  These are: 
a.  The individual chose the Self-Managed Plan 
b.  The individual chose the Portable Benefits Package 
c.  The individual actively chose the Traditional Benefits Package 
d.  The individual made no active choice and was thus defaulted into the Traditional 
Benefits Package 
Table 3 displays the retirement plan choices made across various groups based on 
occupation, plan status, and demographics.  These unconditional tabulations suggest that 
academics at universities are more than twice as likely to enroll in the SMP (the DC plan) and 
are significantly less likely to actively select or be defaulted in to the Traditional (DB) plan than 
are other employees.  Those employees that left their job before vesting (i.e., in less than five 
years) are more apt to have made no pension choice and thus be defaulted into the traditional 
plan ex ante than are employees who ended up staying with their employer or stayed long 
enough to be vested.  This could reflect that, for this group of short-tenured workers, the pension 
choice is not viewed as being of much importance (i.e., differences in plan benefits are much 
more striking after vesting). 
To more formally analyze these plan choices and their determinants, we follow two 
complementary approaches.  First, we analyze a series of linear probability models to provide 
simple to interpret point estimates (marginal effects from Probit models are similar).  We define 
the dependent variable yi in six different ways: (i) chose SMP, (ii) chose Portable, (iii) chose or 
defaulted into Traditional, (iv) made any “active” choice (vs. defaulting), (v) actively chose 
traditional, conditional on being in traditional, and (vi) chose traditional, conditional on making   18
an active choice.  These will be explained in more detail below.  We include a full set of control 
variables.   
  A second approach is to use a multinomial logit model, in recognition of the fact that the 
individual is choosing from among four distinct outcomes that do not have a natural ordering.  In 
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  To identify a multinomial model, it is standard to select one set of coefficients equal to 
zero, so that the remaining set of coefficients measures the change relative to the base group.  In 
our specifications, we will use as our base group those individuals who failed to make an active 
choice and thus defaulted into the Traditional plan (y=4), and thus set β
4(default) =0. 











     
  Thus, the way to interpret the coefficients is that the exponentiated value of a coefficient 
is the relative risk ratio for a one unit change in the corresponding variable, where the risk is 
being measured is the “risk” of choosing SMP relative to taking the default option.  The elements 
of X are the same as in the linear probability models.  In our tables, we will report the relative 
risk ratios for ease of interpretation.   
 
5.  Results on Plan Choice 
5.1 Who Chooses the SMP, Portable, and Traditional? 
  Table 4 reports results from six linear probability models.  We begin in columns 1, 2, and 
3 with an analysis of who chooses the SMP, Portable, and Traditional (whether by active choice 
or default) plans, respectively.  Since an individual will ultimately be in one of these three plans, 
and being in one plan means not being in the other two, the coefficients across the three columns 
will add up to zero (within rounding).  Consistent with the simple tabulations presented in Table 
3, the results clearly indicate strong differences by occupation (which, in this setting, is a good   19
proxy for educational attainment and perhaps financial sophistication).  When one accounts for 
all of the interaction terms, we find that, relative to an academic at a university, staff members at 
a university are 9.7 percentage points less likely to choose the SMP, academics at a community 
college are 3.6 percentage points less likely to choose the SMP, and staff members at a 
community college are 6.9 percentage points less likely to choose the SMP.  These effects are 
quite large given the baseline SMP participation rate of only 15%.  Relative to other occupation 
groups, academics at universities are much less likely to be enrolled in the Traditional plan.  This 
is very much consistent with many academics’ uncertainty surrounding their long-term future at 
a university (i.e., the tenure decision) when these retirement plan decisions are made (recall the 
Traditional plan is particularly attractive for employees likely to have a long stay with their 
employer).  For example, staff members at a university are 13 percentage points more likely to 
be enrolled in the Traditional Plan than are academics (with the difference much more muted 
when one focuses on staff and academics at community colleges).  Part of the community college 
effect might also be driven by the fact that many community colleges in Illinois are heavily 
unionized, and the faculty unions tend to be “pro-DB.” 
  Benefits for police officers under the portable and traditional plans are more generous 
than those for other employees due to the existence of a fourth option for calculating benefits that 
applies only to police and fire employees.  Consistent with this, police officers at a University are 
23.1 percentage points less like to participate in the SMP, while police officers at a community 
college are 10.2 percentage points less likely to do so. 
  There is evidence that there is a correlation between the ex post employment duration and 
the ex ante retirement plan choices.  For example, those individuals that ended up leaving the 
firm before vesting were more likely to enroll in the Traditional plan (the default option).  For a 
worker that leaves SURS before vesting, the choice of retirement plan has little economic 
consequence.  However, workers that ex post left the SURS system, but with sufficient tenure to 
obtain vesting, were much less likely to have chosen the Traditional Plan.  Recall that workers 
who leave their SURS employer after vesting and opt for a refund of their retirement plan 
balance receive both employee and employer contributions under the SMP or Portable plans, but 
relinquish employer contributions under the Traditional plan.  Thus, assuming some foresight in 
employment duration, the coefficients on the “left with vesting” and “left without vesting” 
variables are sensible given the pension plan rules in place.   20
  Higher income workers are more likely to enroll in the SMP or Portable plans, at the 
expense of enrollment in the Traditional plan—a $10,000 increase in earnings corresponds to a 
nearly 3 percentage point increase in the probability of choosing the SMP, a 0.7 percentage point 
increase in the probability of choosing Portable, and a 3.6 percentage point decline in enrollment 
in the Traditional plan.  To the extent that income may proxy for greater financial sophistication 
(similar to being an academic at a university), greater financial sophistication is associated with a 
higher likelihood of selecting the DC plan.  Females are more likely to pick the Portable plan 
than males and married individuals are more likely to pick the SMP than single.  Both younger 
and older individuals seem less likely to select the SMP and are instead more apt to enroll in the 
Traditional plan (but perhaps for different reasons given that the Traditional is also the default 
option).
15  As expected, individuals with prior service in another system with reciprocity are 
more likely to be enrolled in the Traditional plan.   
  We also observe how the plan choice varies over time, holding fixed other characteristics.  
The time series trends presented in Table 4 are very similar to the unconditional trends 
documented in Table 1.  We find that SMP participation rates in 2001 – 2004 are significantly 
lower than the rates in 1999-2000.  These effects are quite large: holding all other covariates 
fixed, an individual joining the plan in 2003 was 11 percentage points less likely to choose the 
SMP than was an individual who joined SURS in 1999.  This is consistent with the possibility 
that SMP participation rates are influenced by equity market performance in prior years.  There 
is very little time trend in take up of the Portable plan from 1999-2004, all of the decrease in 
SMP selection is attributable to an increase in enrollment in the Traditional plan (mainly through 
default). 
  Finally, “Percent on campus” indicates what fraction of the campus population chose the 
same option as the individual.  This is defined by taking the total number of employees on that 
campus at the time the individual began employment who chose the SMP option, for example, 
and dividing it by the total number of campus employees (excluding individual i).  We find a 
strong positive relation for all the pension plan decisions, indicating the possibility of either peer 
effects (e.g., an individual is more likely to choose the SMP if others on the campus also did so), 
“human resources” effects (e.g., the H.R. officer gives common advice to all new employees on 
                                                 
15 The omitted age group in the regression is 35-39.   21
that campus), or more generally sorting of individuals across campuses based on unobserved 
characteristics (to the econometrician) that are correlated with pension plan choice. 
  In unreported results, we further explore peer effects.  In the spirit of Duflo and Saez 
(2002, 2003), we also include the percent of academics making a particular choice and the 
percent of staff making a choice.  We then interact these two campus-wide measures with 
whether the individual is an academic or staff.  This enables us to test whether academics are 
more influenced by the decisions of fellow academics as opposed to staff, and vice versa.  We 
find, across all of the pension choices, that the choice of a given academic is highly correlated 
with that of other academics on campus, but is uncorrelated with that of staff on campus, with 
the reverse also holding. 
  To summarize, we find that the SMP (DC plan) is most likely to be chosen by individuals 
who are highly educated (e.g., university academics) and have higher incomes, while the 
Traditional plan (DB plan) is most likely to be chosen by less educated individuals with lower 
incomes.  In essence, the SMP is disproportionately chosen by the very group that one would 
likely expect to be the most financially sophisticated.  It is ironic, that, as explained in section 2 
above, a close examination of this plan suggests that it may be inferior to the Portable plan in 
most states of the world.  While we plan to do more research on this subject, our initial 
hypothesis is that most participants are making a more general “DB vs. DC” decision, and that 
the SMP may indeed be rationally preferable to the Traditional plan for most of these employees.  
The failure to choose the Portable plan instead, however, may be due to the difficulty of 
understanding the relative advantages of the Portable plan, particular given the manner in which 
this complex information is provided to new participants.  Other possibilities include that 
individuals are over confident in their ability to earn high returns through the SMP or that 
individuals are concerned about political risk in the Portable or DB system.
16 
5.2 Active vs. Passive Choice 
  The results in column 3 combine individuals who actively chose the Traditional plan and 
those who were defaulted into it.  This distinction is worth further consideration, as these may 
represent two very different populations.  In column 4, we use as our dependent variable whether 
the individual simply made any active choice (including SMP, portable, or traditional) as 
                                                 
16 Indeed the recent decision by the Legislature to shift decision making authority over the setting of the ERI in the 
future is one manifestation of political risk.   22
opposed to passively accepting the default.  The complement of this dependent variable is 
defaulting into the Traditional option (and thus the coefficients from a “default” regression will 
simply be the negative of those displayed in column 4).  Consistent with earlier results, we find 
that more educated individuals (academics, university employees), and those with higher 
earnings are more likely to make an active plan choice, as are women, and married individuals.  
As noted earlier, the overall fraction of active decision-making declined substantially over the 
period, falling by 15 percentage points between 1999 and 2003. 
  In columns 5 and 6, we examine individuals who made an active choice to go with the 
Traditional plan, even though an active choice was not necessary to achieve the Traditional plan 
outcome.  In column 5, we limit the sample to those in the Traditional plan, and are thus 
analyzing active vs. passive Traditional plan participants.  We can clearly reject that these two 
groups are the same.  Conditional on ending up in the Traditional plan, it is actually community 
college employees and staff members who are most likely to have actively made this choice.  
Higher earners, women and married individuals are also more likely to have made this active 
choice, while younger people are more likely to have ended up in the Traditional plan by default.  
In sum, the population of defaulters is “different” both from the general population of those that 
made an active pension choice as well as hose that actively selected the same plan as the default 
option (i.e., the Traditional plan). 
  In column 6 we explore how those who actively chose the Traditional plan differ from 
other individuals who made active choices (dropping those who defaulted).  The patterns are 
largely as expected based on earlier results. 
5.3 Campus/Employer Fixed Effects 
  As stated earlier, the framing of the pension plan choice as a discussion of DB vs. DC, as 
opposed to simultaneously comparing all three plans (SMP, Portable, and Traditional) may 
obfuscate the benefits of the Portable plan (particularly relative to the SMP).  Of all the more 
than 60 campuses/employers covered by the State Universities Retirement System (SURS), one 
would expect/hope that the employees of SURS itself, the organization that makes and 
administers the pension plan rules, would be best informed of the pros and cons of all three 
retirement plans.  Focusing on employers with at least 25 new hires over the period 1999-2004 
(there are a handful of employers with just a couple new hires), we find that only 19% of the 
sample chooses the portable option.  In contrast, we find that 49% of new employees working   23
directly for SURS chose the Portable plan.  Not only is this the largest fraction of any employer, 
but it vastly exceeds the 27% of new employees choosing the Portable plan at the next highest 
employer.  Only 5% of SURS employees select the SMP, the 4
th lowest among all employers, 
compared to 15% for the whole sample.  Also, 90% of SURS employees make an active choice 
(i.e., only 10% default into a choice), which is again the highest proportion by far across the 
employers covered by SURS.  This evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that the SMP, 
once its details are understood, is inferior to the Portable plan.  It also suggests, more generally, 
that there may be important employer effects influencing plan choice.   
More formally, in specifications not reported, we have further included employer 
indicator variables in our regression specifications.  While we are no longer able to identify some 
of our campus-wide variables in these specifications (such as community college and its 
interactions, or the % choosing the same option) because of a very little time series variation in 
these variables, we do find that the campus variables are jointly significant, with a p-value of 
0.000, even in a regression that already controls for 3-digit zip codes.  This clearly suggests that 
there are strong campus effects, although it does not allow us to definitively distinguish whether 
it is driven by peer effects, human resource effects, or sorting effects.
17 
5.4 Multinomial Logit Results 
  A limitation of the OLS specification is that they limit us to examining one choice at a 
time.  In reality, individuals can choose from the entire menu of actions upon joining a SURS 
covered employer.  Specifically, there are four distinct actions an individual can take, as noted 
earlier.  In Table 5, we introduce a multinomial logit specification to examine this choice.  By 
treating the default option as our base category, we report the relative risk ratio of our key co-
variates for each of the other three possible outcomes.  In interpreting the coefficients, recall that 
what matters is whether the risk ratio is greater than or less than 1.0.  For example, the relative 
risk ratio of 0.744 for community college in column 1 means that an employee of a community 
college is only 74.4% as likely to choose the SMP over the Traditional plan than is an employee 
of a University.  Note that unlike the earlier table, all of the columns in Table 4 are from the 
same regression.  Column 1 reports the risk ratio for the SMP vs. the default option, column 2 for 
Portable vs. the default option, and column 3 for actively choosing the Traditional plan vs. 
accepting the default option.    
                                                 
17 All of the patterns in coefficients in Table 4 also hold in the employer-fixed-effect regression.   24
  The direction and significance of most of the effects are consistent with what we found 
using the series of linear probability models.  Specifically, relative to university employees, those 
that work for a community college are less likely to choose the SMP or Portable plan, and more 
likely to actively choose the Traditional plan.  Employees at other employer types are less likely 
to make any active choice, meaning that they are much more likely to accept the default.  
Relative to academic employees, staff are also less likely to choose the SMP or Portable options, 
and more likely to actively choose the Traditional plan.  Police officers, particularly those at 
universities, are substantially less likely to take the SMP or Portable option.   
  Individuals who subsequently leave employment for any reason (disability, retirement, 
death, or leaving prior to vesting) are significantly less likely to have been SMP participants.  
Those who left SURS employment with vested benefits were much more likely to have chosen 
the Portable plan.   
  Higher earners and those with full-time status are less likely to default and more likely to 
choose each of the active plans, with the earnings effect strongest for the SMP.  In general, 
women are more likely to make an active choice, as are married individuals.  Individuals under 
the age of 30 are far less likely to make any active choice, while those at over 50 are less likely 
to choose the SMP, but more likely to actively choose the Traditional plan.   
  To put all these findings together, it is useful to consider a few stylized individuals and 
what our results suggest about their choices: 
-  Young, single, male low earners with less job attachment to the SURS employer 
(both in terms of % time worked in terms of whether they subsequently leave) 
are extremely likely to accept the default option. 
-  High earning, well-educated, married professors in their 30’s with the strongest 
attachment to their employer are disproportionately likely to choose the SMP 
plan, and to a slightly lesser extent, the Portable plan. 
-  Older, part-time, married, female, community college staff members with above 
average earnings are disproportionately likely to actively choose the Traditional 
plan.   
 
6.  Conclusions and Future Directions   25
  This paper has provided novel evidence about what types of workers are most likely to 
choose defined contribution plans.  We find that, even in an environment where choosing the 
pure DC plan may not be the best financial decision, individuals are more likely to choose the 
DC option if they are high earners, well-educated, married, in their 30’s, with strong attachment 
to their employer.  These finding suggest that these “educated, high earning, young 
professionals” have a strong preference for DC plans, even when the financial terms are 
unfavorable.  For example, among the 650 individuals in our sample who are full-time, age 30-
39, academics at a university, married, have earnings in excess of $50,000, and are still active 
employees as of spring 2006, 52% of them chose the self-managed plan (versus 15% in the 
sample as a whole).  This is despite the fact that an individual would need to earn a nominal rate 
of return of 5.5% - 11.2% per year (which is, at current inflation rates, substantially higher than 
the 3% real rate in President Bush’s Social Security proposal) in order for the SMP to be 
preferred to the Portable plan.  Using Robert Shiller’s (2005) methodology, we estimate that 
even using what most would consider rather high historical equity returns in the market, no 
cohort of individuals between 1871 and 2004 would be able to achieve these returns by 
following a life-cycle portfolio strategy over their full working lives. 
  This analysis raises fascinating questions as to why individuals who, by most observables, 
appear to be highly capable individuals make what appear to be sub-optimal choices.  We 
speculate that there are at least five reasons why they may do so.  First, participants may simply 
have difficulty processing the complex information that they are provided when making this 
choice, due either to time constraints or some form of bounded rationality.  Second, the 
information provided by SURS may not be optimally designed to facilitate meaningful 
comparisons between the self-managed plan and the portable benefits package.  This might lead 
some employees to mistakenly believe that the self-managed plan is the most generous plan for 
individuals who leave SURS employment early in their career.  Third, individuals may 
understand the rules, but may simply suffer from overconfidence in their investment abilities 
and/or have unrealistically high expectations about future risk-adjusted equity market returns.  
Fourth, individuals may have either rational or irrational beliefs about the degree of political risk 
in the traditional or portable benefit plans, arising due to the chronic under-funding problem 
facing the SURS system.  Fifth, individuals may simply place a very high value on choice for its   26
own sake.  In future research, we intend to explore these alternative hypotheses using a survey of 
current SURS participants.     27
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Table 1: Plan Choice by Start Year                                     
                      
            Start  Year           
                                        
  Total    1999   2000   2001   2002   2003   2004 
Variable  (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)     (7) 
                      
Made an Active Choice  0.443    0.569   0.497   0.421   0.394   0.396   0.402 
       Chose SMP  0.153    0.220   0.215   0.138   0.115   0.118   0.125 
       Chose Portable  0.186    0.204   0.175   0.186   0.190   0.182   0.180 
       Chose Traditional  0.104    0.146   0.107   0.096   0.089   0.096   0.097 
Defaulted into Traditional  0.557    0.431   0.503   0.579   0.606   0.604   0.598 
                      
Number of Observations  45,303     6,596     7,187     8,649     7,975     7,158     7,738   29
Table 2:  
Descriptive Statistics                                  
  
Plan Choice 
                             
    
Made 





Sample   Choice   SMP   Portable   Traditional    Traditional 
Variable  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6) 
                  
O C C U P A T I O N                   
Academic*University 0.315    0.395   0.510   0.415   0.191   0.251 
Staff*University 0.218    0.237   0.159   0.242   0.345   0.202 
Police*University 0.003    0.002   0.001   0.003   0.005   0.004 
Academic*Comm. College  0.233    0.179   0.190   0.143   0.229   0.275 
Staff*Community College  0.151    0.141   0.108   0.152   0.170   0.159 
Police*Community College  0.004    0.004   0.001   0.005   0.006   0.004 
Other  Type  of  Institution  0.077   0.042   0.032   0.042   0.055   0.104 
                  
PLAN  STATUS                  
Active  0.663   0.732   0.787   0.675   0.753   0.609 
Disabled  0.003   0.003   0.002   0.004   0.004   0.003 
Retired  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
Dead  0.001   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.001 
Left with Vested Benefits  0.016   0.022   0.025   0.024   0.014   0.011 
Left Prior to Vesting  0.317    0.243   0.186   0.297   0.228   0.377 
                  
F I N A N C I A L                   
Earnings in $100,000s  0.241    0.318   0.390   0.303   0.237   0.180 
Percentage Time Worked  0.722   0.803   0.799   0.838   0.745    0.659 
                  
DEMOGRAPHICS                  
Female  0.568   0.582   0.525   0.612   0.611   0.557 
Single  0.262   0.340   0.306   0.401   0.280   0.200 
Married  0.590   0.626   0.669   0.563   0.677   0.561 
Age  41.5   42.2   41.9   40.9   45.0   40.9 
                  
Reciprocal Service 
Agreement  0.137   0.114   0.102   0.097   0.162   0.156 
                   
Number of Observations  45,303     20,049     6,920     8,421     4,708     25,254   30
 
Table 3: Plan Choice by Group                      
  
Plan Choice 
                 
        Chose   
Defaulted 
into 
 SMP    Portable    Traditional    Traditional 
Variable  (1)     (2)     (3)     (4) 
            
O C C U P A T I O N             
Academic*University  0.247   0.245   0.063   0.445 
Staff*University  0.111   0.206   0.164   0.518 
Police*University  0.028   0.162   0.155   0.655 
Academic*Community  College  0.125   0.114   0.102   0.660 
Staff*Community  College  0.109   0.186   0.117   0.588 
Police*Community  College  0.035   0.227   0.157   0.581 
            
PLAN  STATUS            
Active  0.181   0.189   0.118   0.512 
Disabled  0.092   0.239   0.146   0.523 
Retired  0.000   0.750   0.000   0.250 
Dead  0.000   0.087   0.087   0.826 
Left  with  Vested  Benefits  0.239   0.277   0.092   0.392 
Left  Prior  to  Vesting  0.090   0.174   0.075   0.662 
            
DEMOGRAPHICS            
Female  0.141   0.200   0.112   0.547 
Male  0.168   0.167   0.094   0.571 
Married  0.164   0.168   0.113   0.555 
Not Married  0.134     0.216     0.089     0.561 
            
RECIPROCAL  SERVICE            
Yes  0.114   0.131   0.123   0.632 
No  0.159   0.195   0.101   0.546   31
Table 4: OLS Estimate of Plan Choice¹                      
                 Dependent Variable             







 SMP    Portable    Traditional    Choice   
Given 
Traditional   Given  Choice   
Independent Variable  (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)    
                    
Community College  -0.036 ***  -0.009 0.047***  -0.017**  0.025***  0.081*** 
 (0.006)    (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.012) 
Other Type of Institution  0.006   -0.012  0.009  -0.008  -0.004  0.036** 
 (0.008)    (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.008)  (0.018) 
Staff -0.097  ***  -0.032***  0.130*** -0.053***  0.078***  0.188*** 
 (0.005)    (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.008) 
Staff*Community College  0.064 ***  0.043*** -0.107***  0.043***  -0.063***  -0.169*** 
 (0.007)    (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.015) 
Police -0.231  ***  -0.076**  0.308*** -0.221***  0.034  0.336*** 
 (0.016)    (0.031)  (0.035)  (0.041)  (0.037)  (0.073) 
Police*Community College  0.129 ***  0.152*** -0.282***  0.252***  0.039  -0.234** 
 (0.022)    (0.045)  (0.048)  (0.056)  (0.053)  (0.093) 
Disabled -0.069  ***  0.015  0.054  -0.073*  -0.037  -0.021 
 (0.023)    (0.037)  (0.040)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.056) 
Retired -0.183  ***  0.418*  -0.242 0.106  -0.369***  -0.260*** 
 (0.038)    (0.227)  (0.231)  (0.256)  (0.023)  (0.051) 
Dead -0.153  ***  -0.093  0.245*** -0.285***  -0.107*  0.236 
 (0.020)    (0.059)  (0.063)  (0.083)  (0.063)  (0.229) 
Left with Vested Benefits  -0.006   0.056*** -0.051***  0.000  -0.063***  -0.071*** 
 (0.016)    (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.021)  (0.019) 
Left Prior to Vesting  -0.062 ***  0.000 0.061***  -0.091***  -0.052***  -0.010 
 (0.004)    (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.008) 
Earnings in $100,000s  0.299 ***  0.065*** -0.364***  0.339***  0.100***  -0.140*** 
 (0.011)    (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.012) 
Percentage Time Worked  -0.027 ***  0.141*** -0.115***  0.144***  0.054***  -0.034** 
 (0.007)    (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.015) 
Female 0.004    0.042***  -0.047***  0.060***  0.033***  -0.008 
 (0.003)    (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
Married 0.029  ***  -0.032***  0.003  0.024***  0.047***  0.032*** 
 (0.005)    (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
Age 15-19  0.047   -0.043  -0.003  -0.078  -0.080***  -0.354*** 
 (0.047)    (0.045)  (0.067)  (0.068)  (0.013)  (0.044) 
Age 20-24  -0.017 **  -0.055***  0.072***  -0.100***  -0.034***  0.008 
 (0.008)    (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.029) 
Age 25-29  -0.019 ***  0.003  0.016**  -0.035***  -0.027***  -0.038*** 
 (0.006)    (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.011) 
Age 30-34  0.009 *  -0.006  -0.003  -0.019***  -0.032***  -0.046***   32
 (0.006)    (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.009) 
Age 40-44  -0.008   0.001  0.007  -0.004  0.003  0.012 
 (0.006)    (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.010) 
Age 45-49  -0.009   -0.005  0.014*  -0.003  0.014*  0.026** 
 (0.006)    (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.011) 
Age 50-54  -0.029 ***  0.001  0.028***  -0.005  0.025***  0.048*** 
 (0.006)    (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.011) 
Age 55-59  -0.035 ***  0.006  0.029***  0.024***  0.068***  0.094*** 
 (0.007)    (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.013) 
Age 60-64  0.011   -0.033  0.022  -0.035  -0.019  -0.004 
 (0.018)    (0.024)  (0.027)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.050) 
Age 65+  -0.054 ***  0.027  0.026  0.062**  0.106***  0.161*** 
 (0.014)    (0.020)  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.041) 
Reciprocal Service Agreement  -0.022 *** -0.020***  0.043***  -0.025***  0.013**  0.063*** 
  (0.005)   (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.011) 
Start Year 2000  -0.015 **  -0.028***  0.044*** -0.077***  -0.074***  -0.035*** 
 (0.007)    (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
Start Year 2001  -0.083 ***  -0.017***  0.103*** -0.137***  -0.099***  -0.018* 
 (0.006)    (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
Start Year 2002  -0.106 ***  -0.008  0.117*** -0.146***  -0.101***  -0.010 
  (0.006)   (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.011) 
Start Year 2003  -0.114 ***  -0.013*  0.129*** -0.149***  -0.098***  0.010 
 (0.006)    (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.012) 
Start Year 2004   -0.107 ***  -0.012* 0.122***  -0.141***  -0.098***  -0.003 
 (0.006)    (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.012) 
% Made Choice on Campus  0.238 *** 0.492***  0.358***  0.356***  0.231***  0.018 
 (0.078)    (0.078)  (0.058)  (0.047)  (0.059)  (0.076) 
Constant 0.207  ***  0.002  0.418*** 0.194***  0.061***  0.203*** 
  (0.013)   (0.018)  (0.043)  (0.031)  (0.022)  (0.029) 
                    
Zip Code Controls (3-digit)?  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
                       
Adjusted R2  0.1053   0.0446  0.1318  0.1305  0.0647  0.0811 
Number of Observations  45,303    45,303   45,303   45,303   29,962   20,049  
¹ Standard Errors in Parentheses; ***, **, * Significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively         33
Table 5: Multinomial Logit Estimate of Plan Choice¹    
        Plan Choice†       
            
 SMP    Portable    Traditional   
Independent Variable  (1)     (2)     (3)    
           
Community College  0.744***  0.788***  1.349 *** 
 (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.080)   
Other Type of Institution  0.447***  0.469***  0.552 *** 
 (0.034)  (0.029)  (0.040)   
Staff 0.432***  0.722***  1.957  *** 
 (0.018)  (0.025)  (0.089)   
Staff*Community College  1.674***  1.460***  0.564 *** 
 (0.113)  (0.085)  (0.040)   
Police 0.061***  0.400***  1.520  * 
 (0.032)  (0.096)  (0.383)   
Police*Community College  3.852**  3.683***  1.067  
 (2.595)  (1.144)  (0.363)   
Disabled 0.458**  0.931  0.715   
   (0.142)  (0.207)  (0.188)  
Retired 0.000***  5.167  0.000  *** 
 (0.000)  (7.164)  (0.000)   
Dead 0.000***  0.280*  0.407   
 (0.000)  (0.212)  (0.302)   
Left with Vested Benefits  0.985  1.392***  0.634 *** 
 (0.103)  (0.136)  (0.089)   
Left Prior to Vesting  0.498***  0.927**  0.615 *** 
 (0.019)  (0.028)  (0.024)   
Earnings in $100,000s  11.116***  4.319***  2.243 *** 
 (0.958)  (0.348)  (0.246)   
Percentage Time Worked  1.231***  3.145***  1.644 *** 
 (0.080)  (0.195)  (0.122)   
Female 1.175***  1.426***  1.262  *** 
 (0.035)  (0.039)  (0.043)   
Married 1.401***  0.970  1.517  *** 
 (0.056)  (0.034)  (0.074)   
Age 15-19  1.037  0.536  0.000 *** 
 (0.789)  (0.397)  (0.000)   
Age 20-24  0.429***  0.613***  0.641 *** 
 (0.068)  (0.059)  (0.085)   
Age 25-29  0.765***  0.953  0.753 *** 
 (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.050)   
Age 30-34  1.029  0.908**  0.713 *** 
 (0.046)  (0.038)  (0.042)   
Age 40-44  0.932  0.996  1.029  
 (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.060)   
Age 45-49  0.934  0.968  1.101 * 
 (0.048)  (0.047)  (0.064)   
Age 50-54  0.799***  0.990  1.192 *** 
 (0.044)  (0.050)  (0.069)   
Age 55-59  0.804***  1.081  1.567 *** 
 (0.050)  (0.060)  (0.095)   
Age 60-64  1.214  0.771  0.887  
 (0.303)  (0.156)  (0.161)   
Age 65+  0.598**  1.302  2.181 *** 
 (0.127)  (0.213)  (0.325)   
Reciprocal Service Agreement  0.812***  0.809***  1.187 *** 
  (0.038) (0.035)  (0.056)   
Start Year 2000  0.765***  0.693***  0.598 *** 
 (0.036)  (0.033)  (0.033)   
Start Year 2001  0.424***  0.639***  0.483 *** 
 (0.021)  (0.029)  (0.026)   
Start Year 2002  0.332***  0.645***  0.463 ***   34
  (0.017) (0.030)  (0.026)   
Start Year 2003  0.307***  0.606***  0.477 *** 
 (0.017)  (0.029)  (0.027)   
Start Year 2004   0.337***  0.617***  0.471 *** 
 (0.018)  (0.030)  (0.027)   
           
Pseudo  R2  0.0871        
Number of Observations  45,303                
¹ Standard Errors in Parentheses; ***, **, * Significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively 
†Default into Traditional Plan is the Omitted Category      
 
 